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The Law & Economics of “Dump & Sue”: Should Plaintiffs’ Attorneys be Prohibited from
Trading the Stock of Companies they Sue? – a Law and Economics Approach
Moin A. Yahya

Abstract

There is some evidence that plaintiffs and their attorneys are profitably
short-selling the stock of the companies they intend to sue. The status of such
short sales is undecided in the law. Lawsuits against companies can cause large
drops in market value, and hence such an action by the plaintiff should cause
concern. Plaintiffs, however, are not traditional insiders, and they do not owe the
shareholders any fiduciary duties. They can therefore consent to their attorneys
also short-selling the stock of the defendant corporation. The attorneys need to
receive such permission to avoid misappropriating the information concerning
their client’s decision to sue. A plaintiff’s decision to sue after short-selling does
not constitute market manipulation in the traditional sense, since the decision to
sue is a true fact that causes the drop in the share price as opposed to those who
commit fraud by spreading false negative stories about the company. Plaintiffs
need, therefore, to be legally deemed temporary insiders until they publicly reveal
their intention to sue or actually sue. The reasons for deeming them insiders, and
hence prohibiting them from short-selling, are threefold. First, allowing such
activities would raise the same concerns regarding market integrity raised by
those opposed to insider trading. Second, allowing such short-selling is a form of
fraud by silence against those who purchase the shares. Third, allowing shortselling would give the plaintiffs double recovery for their lawsuit, as they could
gain a large share of their claim against the company from the profitable short
sales in addition to any verdict or settlement. Furthermore, proposals to extend
Regulation FD to plaintiff’s attorneys would be ineffective in combating the harm
from such short-selling. The law, therefore, through either developments by the
courts, regulatory promulgations by the SEC, an act of Congress, or a
combination of any of the preceding three mechanisms should be used to treat
plaintiffs as insiders until they sue or announce their intention to sue.
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The Law & Economics of “Sue and Dump”: Should Plaintiffs’ Attorneys be Prohibited
from Trading the Stock of Companies they Sue? – a Law and Economics Approach
Moin A. Yahya
Introduction
The first I had heard of a plaintiff’s lawyer short-selling the stock of a company he was
about to sue was in The King of Torts,1 a recent John Grisham novel.2 The lead character, a
plaintiffs’ attorney short-sells3 the stock of a pharmaceutical company that he is about to sue for
a negligently produced drug. When the lawsuit is announced, the price of the stock drops and
the attorney profits handsomely.4 Later, the attorney is investigated for insider trading, since the
information that he based his suit upon came from a stolen document. Fiction The King of Torts
may be, but it seems that life has been imitating fiction without any repercussions, so far, for any
of the potential wrongdoing parties. For example, in a recent lawsuit against Eckerd Drug Stores
(Eckerd), owned by J.C. Penney Co. (Penney), there is some evidence of a link between the law
firm that sued Eckerd and a New York hedge fund that often takes short positions.5 The lawsuit
alleged that Eckerd had been engaged in a widespread practice of overcharging for prescription
drugs. The lawsuit negatively impacted Penney’s stock by over 30%. While the shareholders
took a beating, a short-seller who shorted Penney’s stock before the suit was filed could have
profited greatly.
Many short-sellers began hearing rumors that a lawsuit was going to be filed against
Eckerd. The idea of the lawsuit came when a druggist for one of the Eckerd drugstores began

1

JOHN GRISHAM, THE KING OF TORTS 186 (2003).
Professor Stephen Bainbridge had foreseen this issue many years ago. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading
Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 IOWA J. L. CORP. 1 (1993).
3
Short-selling is the sale of a security that the seller must borrow, and is usually done when the seller expects the
price of the security to fall. Black’s Law Dictionary 560 (Pocket ed. 1996).
4
Grisham, supra note 1, at 377.
5
David Armstrong & Ann Zimmerman, Sowing Doubts: Battering Penney, A Lawsuit Served Short-Sellers Well,
WALL STREET JOURNAL January 1, 2003 at page A1.
2

3

voicing complaints that Eckerd might be overcharging. An analyst with a short-selling New
York hedge fund called the druggist and collected information regarding his complaints. The
druggist claims that the analyst asked him to speak with a private investigator who was known to
work with law firms that file class action securities litigation.6
The druggist was also frequently contacted by a doctor-turned-analyst who worked for
another broker-dealer located in New York. This analyst contacted the druggist over 30 times
and updated him on the steps being taken for the lawsuit, but also supposedly admonished him
not to reveal their conversations. The druggist claims that the analyst indicated that he was
communicating with the lead plaintiff’s attorney prior to the lawsuit being filed. The attorney
has refused to answer questions regarding the basis for his interest in Eckerd or whether he had
discussed the suit with short-sellers prior to filing the suit. The short-sellers were at the
courthouse the day of the filing (or the next day) to receive a copy of the lawsuit from the clerk’s
office. The short-sellers deny any advance knowledge of the suit. In fact, the short-sellers deny
that they personally short-sold Penney’s stock, and they refuse to answer whether they had
advised any clients to short-sell the stock.
The story does not conclusively show that there was any communication or coordination
between the short-sellers and the lawyers, but the circumstances suggest that short-sellers and
plaintiffs’ attorneys are joining forces. In the past, short-sellers have been blamed for spreading
unfavorable rumors concerning companies in which they have short positions.7 For example,
short-sellers have been accused of coordinating the release of false information8 and stirring up

6

The analyst denies paying the private investigator.
Randall Smith, Henny Sender & Charlie Gasparino, Will Scrutiny of Hedge Funds Lead to Charges?, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, January 24th, 2003 at page C1.
8
Id.
7
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negative sentiments regarding the companies whose stock they are short-selling.9 In the most
recent example of this, Chief Judge Patel of the United States District Court for Northern
California disqualified the lead plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action when it emerged that
the plaintiffs had been short-selling the stock of the defendant corporation.10 The defendant
Terayon manufactures cable modem systems that provide Internet communication services to
cable subscribers.11 Terayon was developing a new communications technology, and it was
seeking the approval of CableLabs, the consortium that enforces industry standards for such
devices.
The lead plaintiffs Cardinal Investment Company (Cardinal), a Texas investment
company, and others affiliated with the company decided that Terayon Communications systems
(Terayon) was a good candidate for short-selling, and proceeded to sell the stock short.12 The
price of Terayon’s stock, however, began to rise. This caused millions of dollars of losses for the
plaintiffs. Cardinal and the others allegedly decided to hatch a “game plan” to force the price of
the stock to fall. Cardinal and the other lead plaintiffs surmised that CableLabs would not
approve of Terayon’s new technology. Cardinal began to accuse Terayon of fraudulently
misrepresenting that its new technology would be approved, hoping that these allegations would
lower the price of the stock. Cardinal contacted Fortune magazine and the Wall Street Journal
and communicated its allegations of fraud to their reporters. News stories appeared in both
publications, but nonetheless the price of the stock remained steady. Cardinal then began a letter
writing campaign to the SEC and other government agencies accusing Terayon of fraud. Finally,
9

Christina Binkley, Marriott Settles Suit Involving Management Fee, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 28th, 2003 at
page B3.
10
In re Terayon Communications Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 413277 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also Reynolds Holding,
Double-Whammy in Stock Fraud Case: Short-sellers Trash, then Sue, Santa Clara Tech Firm, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, November 9th, 2003 at A1.
11
In re Terayon Communications Systems, Inc., 2002 WL 989480 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
12
Put options were also purchased. A put option is an option to sell a security at a fixed price even (especially) if
the market declines. Black’s Law Dictionary 459 (Pocket ed. 1969).
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through Internet postings they encouraged parties to contact the law firm of Milberg Weiss, a
firm that Cardinal had been in communication with for some time, about a potential lawsuit
against Terayon. Cardinal posted more stories about the imminence of a lawsuit and claims of
fraud by Terayon. All of this was done with an eye to lowering the stock price. At last the stock
price dropped, but so did the whole stock market as the tech bubble burst. A suit alleging fraud
was filed the next day claiming that the investors had lost millions of dollars due to the fraud of
Terayon. The irony of the suit was that Cardinal sought to be the lead plaintiff, when Cardinal
had always been determined to see the price of the stock drop without any long position in
Terayon’s stock. The millions of dollars it lost were due to the price of the stock rising and not
because of any fraud inducing Cardinal to buy Terayon stock. Chief Judge Patel recognized the
irony and the conflict of interest between Cardinal and other investors who had actually
purchased Terayon’s stock in dismissing both Cardinal as the lead plaintiff and Milberg Weiss as
the lead attorney from the case.
Chief Judge Patel also noted the suspicious circumstances of the suit whereby Cardinal
had been in contact with Milberg Weiss long before the date of the suit. It seemed almost as if
the suit was planned in advance to drive the share price down to allow for a profitable shortselling by Cardinal. She noted a similar scheme between short-selling plaintiffs and Milberg
Weiss in another securities fraud case.13
The threat of a suit lowering the price of the defendant’s stock has always been a
conventional litigation pressure tactic by the plaintiffs’ bar. For example, in a lawsuit against the
German drug manufacturer Bayer, the plaintiff’s attorney Mikal Watts allegedly noted to Bayer’s

13

Fields v. Biomatrix, 198 F.R.D. 451 (D.N.J. 2000). See also Robert Lenzner & Emily Lambert, Mr. Class
Action, FORBES February 16th, 2004 at 82 (suggesting that Milberg Weiss has communicated with short-sellers in the
past, as well reporting a federal investigation into whether Milberg Weiss paid lead plaintiffs in their many class
action lawsuits).
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counsel on several occasions that “[Bayer’s] stock price is going to tank”, while another
plaintiffs’ attorney suing Bayer suggested that Bayer should “know the impact on … [its] stock
price if [Bayer didn’t] settle.”14 Similarly, famed plaintiffs’ attorney Richard (Dickie) Scruggs in
his suits against the HMOs spoke to many analysts at Wall Street firms, such as Morgan Stanley
and Prudential, and urged many institutional investors to force the HMOs to settle the suits with
him and other plaintiffs’ attorneys.15 The share price of most the HMOs involved in the suits had
lost half of their value, and Scruggs used this as a tactical tool to try to force the HMOs to settle.
The fact that the stock price falls when a suit is launched seems to be used by the attorneys for
profit rather than just for pressure.
Despite these incidents, no case law on this subject exists. While the judge in In re
Terayon disqualified the Cardinal group as lead plaintiff for its short-selling activities and found
Cardinal’s actions suspect, she did not suggest that the action was criminal or actionable.16
Similarly, in Fields v. Biomatrix,17 the judge allowed a group of short-sellers who also held long
positions in the stock of the firm they were suing to remain in the plaintiff class. This may
suggest that none of this activity is suspect.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge prophetically addressed this issue over ten years ago when
he discussed the (then) proposed draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.18 In
his article, he argued that lawyers should never be allowed to use confidential information they
obtain through their dealings with their clients to purchase the stock of companies that the client
14

Monica Langley, Bayer Fights Back: Bayer, Pressed to Settle a Flood of Suits over Drugs, Fights Back, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, May 3, 2004 at page A1.
15
Collin Levey, Three Ways to Shake Down an HMO, WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 1, 2000 at page A19; Milo
Geyelin, Lawyer Seeks Support for Settlement with HMOs, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 22, 1999 at page B2;
David Segal, Tag-Team Lawyers Make Businesses Blink: HMOs Latest to Grapple with Threat of Investor-Scaring
Mega-Verdicts, WASHINGTON POST, November 12, 1999 at page A1; Jim Lafferty, Editorial, Stock Market ‘Tips’ a
Plot to Force Companies to Settle Suits, VENTURA CITY STAR, November 28, 1999 at page B9.
16
In re Terayon Communications Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 413277 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
17
Fields v. Biomatrix, 198 F.R.D. 451 (D.N.J. 2000).
18
Bainbridge, supra note 2.
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is involved in. He argued that to allow this would violate their ethical duties as well as their
duties stemming from their fiduciary and agency relationships with their clients.
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a Washington, D.C. based public interest law
firm, has released the only publication, to date, addressing this practice. It published a short
article and has sent letters to various regulatory agencies. The article, penned by Victor
Schwartz and Peter Bernstein, concluded that existing securities law does not address this type of
activity despite the negative impact it has on investors and the market.19 They recommended that
the SEC enact rules requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys who communicate with securities analysts to
disclose their communications in a manner similar to the requirements of Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Regulation FD).20 WLF has addressed numerous letters to the SEC requesting that
they investigate the activities of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the Eckerd and Terayon lawsuits
described above. Furthermore, they have also requested that the SEC introduce regulations
similar to Regulation FD that would require plaintiffs’ attorneys to disclose their
communications with analysts.
Perhaps because the phenomenon of plaintiffs’ attorneys short-selling the stock of a
defendant corporation is recent or not perceived as a common practice, little attention is paid to
this by writers, regulators, and the courts. Hence, other than the WLF publications and the
article by Bainbridge, little has been written on the subject.
This paper will proceed as follows. In Section II, I will demonstrate why we should be
concerned about plaintiffs who short-sell the defendant’s stock. Section III will survey the law
of securities fraud, specifically looking at insider trading as well as general fraud. I will analyze
the status of the plaintiff’s attorney in Section IV, while Section V will discuss the status of the
19

Victor E. Schwartz & Peter D. Bernstein, Protect Investors form Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ Stock Manipulation, 18
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (NO. 28), June 27, 2003.
20
17 C.F.R. 243.100-103 (2005).
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plaintiff. Section VI will look at some common law principles to determine whether the plaintiff
is engaging in fraud; this will set up Section VII to where I will propose a rule that plaintiffs
should be deemed insiders until they disclose that they intend to sue. I will finally conclude.

II.

Does it Matter? The Impact of Lawsuits on the Value of the Firm
When a lawsuit against a publicly traded corporation is announced, economic theory

predicts that the price of the corporation’s shares will fall. To see this, one must understand how
the price of a share is derived. A share is an ownership interest in the firm.21 The owner of the
share, the shareholder, has an ownership claim on the assets of the firm. Among these assets is
the stream of income that the firm will earn over the its lifetime. The share, therefore, derives its
value from the expected flow of income that will accrue to the shareholder.22
Suppose, for example, there are 100 shares for a particular company, and a shareholder
owns one share. This shareholder has a claim to one percent of any of the firm’s assets,
including future income streams. Ignoring physical assets, suppose the firm earns $100 a year in
net profits and is expected to earn this for the foreseeable future. Then, one share would
represent a claim against $1 a year forever, and the value of the share would be the present value
of $1 a year forever. If the $1 per share a year in net profits is expected to grow, then the price
of the share will be higher, because the price will incorporate this expected growth.
If, on the other hand, there is an indication that the net profits earned by the firm will
decline, then the price of the firm’s shares should also decline. When a lawsuit is announced,
this news forces the market to revise its expectation concerning the profitability of the firm.

21

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (2002).
The methodology for valuing stocks is standard fare in the field of finance. Illustrative of this are ZVI BODIE &
ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 234-53 (2000); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE 316-38 (2004).
22

9

Suppose that our hypothetical firm earns $1 a year per share, and a lawsuit is announced where
the market believes that the firm will lose with certainty and have to pay $10 in damages, or $0.1
per share. The price of the share will, therefore, diminish by ten cents. If the market believes,
however, that the probability that the firm may lose the lawsuit is 50%, then the market will
diminish the price of the share by only five cents. If the market believes that the payout will be
higher than the $10 hypothesized, the diminution in share price will be greater than ten cents, and
vice versa.
At the very least, because of the cost of litigation, even if the market believes with
certainty that the defendant firm will be successful, the price of the shares will have to decline by
an amount reflecting the costs of litigation. This means, that a plaintiff’s attorney can always
force some diminution in the price of a firm’s shares simply by announcing a lawsuit, however
frivolous it may be. The empirical evidence confirms this.
Several scholars have studied the impact of the announcement of a lawsuit against
publicly traded companies on the value of their shares. For example, Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles
studied the impact of lawsuits on the market value of corporations involved in the lawsuit.23
They compiled a dataset of all lawsuits filed, settlements reached, or verdicts rendered which
were reported in the Wall Street Journal for the period 1981-83.24 They examined the impact of

23

Sanjai Bhagat, John Bizjak, & Jeffery L. Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits, 27
FIN. MGMT. 5 (1998). There were some earlier studies that looked at individual cases or a few select cases, and their
results are consistent with the Bhagat, Bizjak, & Coles study. See e.g. John Bizjak & Jeffery Coles, The Effect of
Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 436 (1995); Kathleen
Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEG. STUD.
377 (1988). In another study, the authors studied the impact of several events in the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation on
the value of both plaintiff and defendant’s shares. The effect of the announcement, however, was not one of the
events. David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress:
Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157 (1995).
24
Bhagat et al., supra note 23, at 10.
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the filings on the market value of 618 corporate defendants.25 They classified the cases by
whether the lawsuit was filed by another firm, the government, or an individual. Additionally,
the cases were classified by the nature of the legal claim: antitrust, breach of contract, corporate
governance, environmental claims, product liability, patent infringement, Federal Trade
Commission type suits, and SEC type suits.26 They found that defendants lose an average of
0.97% of shareholder value upon the announcement of the filing of a lawsuit, leading the authors
to conclude that “plaintiffs can and do damage defendants in a lawsuit.”27 This is a significant
drop in shareholder value and is clearly material by any standard. In terms of who brings the
suit, they found that government suits against a corporation have the largest impact on the
shareholder value, lowering shareholder value of defendant corporations by as much as 1.73%.28
Suits against corporations by non-corporate defendants lowered shareholder value by 0.81%, and
suits by other corporations brought an average decline of 0.75%.29 In terms of types of actions,
environmental causes of action caused the highest loss in shareholder value (3.08%), followed by
SEC type suits (2.71%), patent infringement suits (1.50%), product liability suits (1.46%), and
antitrust suits (0.81%).30 The fact that a lawsuit by a government agency can have such a large
impact on the defendant’s value may explain why the plaintiff’s in the JC Penney case agitated
for the government to investigate Eckerd Drug Stores; a larger drop in the value could be more
beneficial to short-sellers who were allegedly in contact with the plaintiff’s attorney.

25

They also examine the impact of the settlements as well as the impact of the filings and settlements on the market
value of the plaintiff if it was also a firm. For the purposes of this paper, however, I am only concerned with the
impact on the defendant corporation, since the plaintiff and the attorney are usually individuals in the examples
described so far.
26
Bhagat et. al., supra note 23, at 12.
27
Bhagat et. al., supra note 23, at 15. In an earlier study, they found that when a corporation sues another
corporation, the defendant’s shareholder value declines by about 1%. Sanjai Bhagat, John Bizjak, & Jeffery L.
Coles, The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221 (1994).
28
Bhagat et. al., supra note 23,at 17.
29
Bhagat et. al., supra note 23,at 17.
30
Bhagat et. al., supra note 23,at 18.
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Other studies confirm the general results of Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles. Muoghalu,
Robison, and Glascock found that the announcement of Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and Superfund lawsuits caused an average drop in the defendant’s shareholder value by
1.2%.31 Cross, Davidson, and Thornton also found that Director and Officer lawsuit
announcements lower the shareholder value of the firms that are sued, but their research
indicated that the reason for the lawsuits does not affect the magnitude of the loss.32
In another comprehensive study, David Prince and Paul Rubin studied the impact of
product liability litigation on firms in the automobile and pharmaceutical industries.33 They
found that the filing of a lawsuit or a news story that subsequently leads to the filing of a lawsuit
has a negative impact on the value of the defendant’s firm. In the automobile industry, they
found that a lawsuit against one firm lowers the value of all firms in the industry, while a lawsuit
in the pharmaceutical industry against one firm increases the value of other firms in the
industry.34
In all these studies, the results are clear: the announcement of a lawsuit lowers the market
value of the defendant. This means that the plaintiff’s attorney who short-sells the defendant’s
stock is almost guaranteed to profit from this strategy.
31

Michael I. Muoghalu, David H. Robison, & John L. Glascock, Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Stockholder Returns,
and Deterrence, 57 SOUTH. ECON. J. 357 (1990). See also Michael Muoghalu & John E. Rogers, The Economic
Impact of Superfund’s Litigation on the Value of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis, 16 J. ECON. & FIN. 73 (1992)
(finding similar results). In a study of Canadian lawsuits by the various Canadian government agencies against
corporations, the announcement of the lawsuit had little impact on shareholder value, but the announcement of the
settlement did, suggesting that “enforcement of environmental regulations in the United States is more severe
(credible) than in Canada.” Benoit Laplante & Paul Lanoie, The Market Response to Environmental Incidents in
Canada: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 60 SOUTH. ECON. J. 657 (1994).
32
Mark L. Cross, Wallace N. Davidson, & John H. Thornton, The Impact of Directors and Officers’ Liability Suits
on Firm Value, 56 J. RISK & INS. 128 (1989). In another study, Pruitt and Nethercutt found that when an explosive
audio-tape containing racial slurs by Texaco executives was released while a racial discrimination suit was pending
against Texaco, Texaco shareholders lost $500 million. Stephen W. Pruitt & Leonard L. Nethercutt, The Texaco
Racial Discrimination Case and Shareholder Wealth, 23 J. LABOR RESEARCH 685 (2002).
33
David W. Prince & Paul H. Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on the Value of Firms, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 44 (2002).
34
In the study of the racial discrimination suit against Texaco, the authors found that the loss in shareholder value
did not affect the value of other oil companies. Pruitt & Nethercutt, supra note 32.
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III.

The Law of Securities Fraud
To decide whether there is something inappropriate about a plaintiff or the plaintiff’s

attorney short-selling the target company’s stock, a quick survey of the laws concerning the sale
of securities is needed. In this section, I will briefly outline the two basic rubrics under which
certain transactions may be considered fraudulent. The two rubrics are (1) general securities
fraud and (2) insider trading, which is a subset of general fraud. I will discuss some of the recent
developments in the law of insider trading as well as the recently enacted Regulation FD. The
discussion of insider trading and its illegality is also accompanied by an examination of the
policy reasons behind its prohibition. These policy reasons will be used to evaluate the status of
the short-selling plaintiff in the next section. Before proceeding, I shall introduce the term
“short-selling plaintiff” to denote a plaintiff who sells short the stock of the corporation he or she
is about to sue.
1. General Background on Securities Regulation
Securities were for the most part, regulated at the state level until the 1930s when the
perceived need for uniformity via federal laws resulted in the enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA).35 The SEA establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and authorizes it to combat illegal securities practices.36 A very powerful section of the
SEA, due to its very general language, Section 10(b)37 prohibits the use of “manipulative or
deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s] in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC]

35

An excellent source of information on this subject is STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER
TRADING 7-48 (1999); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 21, at 518-609.
36
15 U.S.C 78j.
37
15 U.S.C 78j(b).
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may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”
when such deception is used “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”38
Section 10(b) has been expanded by various rules promulgated by the SEC and various
judicial opinions.39 For example, Rule 10b-5,40 prohibits the employment of “any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or the making of “any untrue statement of a material fact or …
omit[ing] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or [engaging] in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
Given the generality of both Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b), it should be no surprise that
these two provisions are the main source of prosecution for market manipulation generally and
insider trading specifically.41 It is these two areas of securities fraud that I discuss in the next
two sub-sections.
2. General Manipulation of the Market: What is it, and does it apply?
While Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) apply to all types of market manipulation and
securities fraud, two types of market manipulation are of interest for the purposes of analyzing
the short-selling plaintiff. These are the “pump and dump” and “Cyber-smear” schemes.42

38

Shareholders can bring private suits against those who violate this and other sections of the SEA to recover the illgotten profits. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1. There are criminal penalties for violating section 10(b), which can include fines of
up to five million dollars and/or jail time of up to twenty years. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. Civil penalties may be imposed of
up to three times the profits made from trading using the insider information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1. In addition,
shareholders can also bring private suits against the insiders to recover the profits. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1.
39
The SEC is authorized to enact regulations to enforce this and all sections of the SEA. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)(“ any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
40
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41
Other statutory provisions that can be used against fraud include section 9 of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. 78i; section
15(c)(1)of the SEA, 115 U.S.C. 78o(c)(1); section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a).
42
Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, “You’ve Got Jail”: Current Trends in Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
Internet Securities Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405, 411 (2001).
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The “pump and dump” schemes usually involve the spreading of positive false or
misleading information about a company to generate an interest in the company’s stock, and a
subsequent increase in its price, thereby allowing the profitable sale of the stock owned by those
spreading the information.43 This is done typically on Internet message boards. The “smear and
dump” scheme is the reverse of the “pump and dump”, where a short-seller spreads negative
false or misleading information about a company driving down the company’s stock price,
allowing the profitable covering of the short-position by those spreading the information.44 The
reason for the term “cyber” is that the Internet has become the preferred mode of these
schemes.45
One of the most famous “pump and dump” operations was that operated by Jonathan
Lebed.46 Lebed, who was fifteen years old at the time of his infamy, engaged in his scheme
eleven times between August 23, 1999 and February 4, 2000.47 He “purchased large blocks of
thinly traded microcap stocks and, within hours of making such purchases, sent numerous false
and/or misleading messages … over the Internet touting the stocks he had just purchased.”48 His
net profit from these schemes was $272,826.49
He would acquire large amounts of stock in a thinly traded company and then post his
messages.50 His messages were “generally devoid of substantive content” and simply stated that
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the stock would “take off,” be the “next stock to gain 1,000%,” or that the stock was “the most
undervalued stock ever.”51 The SEC settled with Mr. Lebed, and he was ordered to disgorge his
profits. The SEC founded their claim of fraud against Lebed under Sections 17(a) and 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5.52 The lesson from the Lebed case and numerous
others,53 is that simply posting messages, no matter how sparse and devoid of content, seems to
51
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be enough to garner an administrative sanction, if not a criminal conviction. While an analogy
between the short-selling plaintiff’s attorney and Mr. Lebed might be constructed, the more
appropriate analogy is the “Cyber-smear” or “smear and dump” scheme.
An example of a “smear and dump” scheme is the case of Mark S. Jakob, a 23 year-old
former community college student, who put out a fake negative news release causing the decline
of the price of the Emulex Corporation’s stock.54 He had sold 3000 shares of Emulex short
speculating that the price of the shares would drop. The price of the shares rose over 40 per cent
after his transaction, and he stood to lose over $100,000. So Mr. Jakob sent fake news releases
to an Internet wire service that distributed corporate news releases. The fake news claimed that
the company’s chief executive officer had resigned, that the SEC was investigating the firm, and
that the company would be revising its earnings. When the fake news was released, the price of
Emulex’s stock almost immediately plummeted from over $100 per share to just over $40 per
share. Emulex lost over $2 billion in market capitalization in just over fifteen minutes. The
hoax was eventually corrected, but not before Mr. Jakob profited and many investors, who sold
in the panic, lost millions. Ultimately Mr. Jakob was arrested and sentenced to 44 months in jail,
in addition to fines and civil penalties.
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Similarly, Fred Moldofsky sold Lucent stock short, and then posted fake press releases on
a Yahoo! Finance message board.55 He profited when the price of Lucent’s stock fell after he
released a fake Lucent press release claiming that Lucent expected an earnings shortfall.
Lucent’s shares fell by 3.6% and knocked off $1.7 billion of market value. He was charged with
securities fraud, and he, like Mr. Jakob, was charged with violating Section 10(b) of the SEA and
Rule 10b-5. Other such charges have been laid against individuals who have posted false stories
with an eye to profitably short-selling the stock of the companies they smear.56
These are but a few examples of schemes that market manipulators engage in, and I leave
the analysis of whether the short-selling plaintiff falls into this category until after the discussion
of insider trading.
3. Insider Trading: A Brief Introduction
Insider trading is defined as illegally transacting in a corporation’s stock to take
advantage of one’s knowledge of secret information usually acquired through a confidential
relationship with the corporation.57 The definition does not identify who an insider is, nor does it
explain when it is illegal to do so. This is because the question of who is an insider has never
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been clear and evolves over time. This evolution is a result of the general language and hence
the lack of clarity in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
A series of adjudications by the SEC and the courts agreeing or disagreeing with the
SEC’s view of who is an insider and what activity is illegal has, over time, defined the insider.
At common law an insider was at best a corporate officer, director, or controlling shareholder.58
For example the United States Supreme Court invalidated a profitable purchase of stock by an
insider, a director and controlling shareholder, from another shareholder, when the insider knew
that the price of his stock was going to rise.59 Many courts held that an insider’s duty to refrain
from insider trading flowed from their fiduciary duties to the shareholders (in addition to their
traditional duties to the corporation). Insiders, these courts held, should disclose the confidential
information to the shareholders or refrain from trading using that information. The main concern
was that insiders who obtained information by virtue of their position would be able to profitably
trade at the expense of uninformed shareholders. A classical insider, therefore, was and is an
officer, director, or controlling shareholder who learns of some non-public confidential
information, and hence is prohibited from trading the stock of the company (where he or she is
the insider) using that confidential information.
Classical insiders were the group to whom the SEC and the courts initially confined their
prohibition against insider trading. Three points must be mentioned before proceeding. The first
is that despite the fact that state law was never uniform in holding that classical insiders owed
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their shareholders a duty to refrain from trading before disclosing,60 federal insider trading law
has assumed that such a duty does exist.61 Second, the law of insider trading has assumed that
simple non-disclosure by an insider when trading is the equivalent to fraud, even the law in many
states usually require more than non-disclosure such as fraudulent concealment.62 Third, even
though there might be a fiduciary duty from an insider to a shareholder, the existence of such a
duty from an insider to a non-shareholder purchaser (i.e. when an insider sells the stock short)
was never clear at state law, is not clear from first principles, but nonetheless is the rule under
federal insider trading law.63
In the 1960s, however, the SEC began to expand its definition of insider. The SEC
initially adopted the position that anyone who possessed non-public material information was an
insider and was prohibited from trading using the information absent disclosure.64 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with this view and announced a broad
prohibition against the use of non-public material information in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
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Co.65 The case announced two broad rules. The first was that whenever an insider possessed
material non-public information, the insider could not trade the company’s stock unless the
information was disclosed to the public.66 This is known as the “disclose or abstain” rule. The
second rule was that anyone who possessed material non-public information was effectively an
insider; subsequently, anyone who had access to confidential information would be prohibited
from trading unless the information was disclosed.67 It did not matter how the potential trader
learnt the information, because the court endorsed the SEC’s position that:
anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation has “access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone” may not take “advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing,” i.e., the investing public.68

At the same time other courts were also announcing expansive views of the scope of rule
10b-5. In White v. Abrams, the Ninth Circuit adopted a flexible duty test that made the rule one
of negligence rather than fraud and expanded the scope of its application.69 The court announced
a list of factors that determined the scope of the duty under Rule 10b-5:
[1] the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, [2] the defendant’s access to the information as
compared to the plaintiff’s access, [3] the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, [4] the
defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his investment
decisions and [5] the defendant’s activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.70

Despite that the Supreme Court overruled Abrams when it held that scienter was necessary for
rule 10b-5 liability,71 the courts continued to use the factors to determine the scope of duty owed
under the rule. For example, in Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,72 parties to a corporate merger sued a
financial columnist who had published a misleadingly favorable story about one of the
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corporations whose stock he had profitably purchased. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal
by the district court and held that he had violated Section 10(b) of the SEA and rule 10b-5
because he failed to disclose to his readers that he had purchased the stock of the subject of his
column and expected to gain personally if they followed his advice. The Court held that the
defendant owed the plaintiffs, the parties to the merger who were not readers of defendant’s
column, a duty because the plaintiffs “were in a position similar to that of [defendant’s] readers.
[The Plaintiffs] and the readers had strikingly similar stakes in the processes of the market.”73
The court went on to state that the plaintiffs when making their deal, had relied on “the existence
of an honest market.”74 This is because
[a] market presumes the ability of investors to assess all the relevant data on a stock, including the
credibility of those who recommend it, in creating a demand for that stock. In effect, [plaintiffs] in
good faith placed [their] fate in the hands of market investors, including [defendant’s] readers.
[Plaintiffs] relied on the forces of a fully informed market. Instead, it was forced to sell in a
manipulated market.75

The court defined the newspaper columnist as a “quasi-insider.”76 Quasi-insiders, the court
explained, are “people who obtain nonpublic information from a source outside a corporation
about events or circumstances which will affect the market in the corporation's stock. An
example of a ‘quasi-insider’ would be a Federal Reserve Bank employee who trades with
knowledge of an upcoming change in margin rate.”77 Quasi-insiders are those who possess nonpublic information obtained from a source outside the corporation that may affect the price of the
stock. The court used the Abrams factors to decide that the columnist owed market participants a
duty to disclose or abstain from trading under rule 10b-5.
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The United Supreme Courtnarrowed the scope of the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule in
Chiarella v. United States.78 Chiarella was an employee of a financial printer that prepared
documents relating to upcoming mergers. The company used codes instead of the names of the
companies involved in the mergers, but Mr. Chiarella cracked the codes allowing him to
profitably purchase the stock of a target company. The Supreme Court reasoned that since
Chiarella was not a traditional insider, he owed no fiduciary duty to anyone, and hence was not
guilty of violating Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court did not address a theory called the
misappropriation theory, a theory that Chief Justice Burger argued for in his dissent. Chief
Justice Burger argued that the printer had “misappropriated” the confidential information from
his employer; he was obligated to keep that information secret due to his employment contract,
therefore he should be equally culpable as if an insider had traded on the non-public
information.79 Anyone who misappropriated material non-public information in breach of an
employment, fiduciary or other such duty was under an obligation to refrain from trading on that
information, the Chief Justice argued.
The SEC, undeterred by Chiarella, continued to pursue the misappropriation theory as a
basis for prosecuting outsiders. The Second Circuit adopted the “misappropriation” theory when
it held that an outsider with no fiduciary duty to the shareholders could be liable under rule 10b-5
in United States v. Newman.80 Newman was a securities trader who received non-public
information from two investment bankers who had “misappropriated” it from their employers.
Soon after, the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC reversed a censure by the SEC of a securities

78

445 U.S. 222 (1980).
The SEC effectively overruled the Chiarella duty requirement by issuing rule 14e-3, available at 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3, that prohibits anyone from trading based on non-public information concerning tender offers if they
knew that the information came from an insider.
80
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
79

23

analyst who told his clients about fraud in a corporation using non-public information.81 Since
the analyst told the information only for the purpose of exposing fraud, he had no fiduciary duty
to the shareholders, and neither those who received the information nor the analyst had
misappropriated the information. Two aspects of Dirks are noteworthy. The first is that the
Court looked to the intent of the insider when making the disclosure and opined that courts
should focus on “whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings.”82 The second aspect is the statement by the Court that
[u]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become
fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons
acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes.83

The Supreme Court was beginning to allow the misappropriation theory to seep into its
jurisprudence.
The misappropriation theory was tested once more in United States v. Carpenter.84 A
newspaper columnist whose columns influenced the price of stock shared his upcoming column
with a friend who traded on this not yet released information and profited. The columnist and his
friend were convicted under the misappropriation theory and other fraud theories. The Second
Circuit affirmed the conviction on the misappropriation theory, and the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction on the general fraud theory but evenly divided over the misappropriation fraud
theory, thereby affirming his conviction on both counts.85
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Not all the Circuit Courts, however, agreed with the misappropriation theory. The Fourth
Circuit, for example, rejected the misappropriation theory in two companion cases, United States
v. Bryan and United States v. ReBrook. In United States v. ReBrook, the district court denied a
motion to dismiss a criminal indictment against a defendant who was charged with insider
trading.86 The defendant was the attorney for the West Virginia Lottery that had decided to
award a lottery contract to a particular company. The defendant profitably purchased stock in
the company and informed three of his acquaintances who then also profitably purchased stock
in the company. The district court used the misappropriation theory to uphold the indictment.
The court decided that the defendant owed the West Virginia Lottery a duty of confidentiality,
and by trading on the non-public information he had breached that duty. The conviction on the
insider trading charges were eventually reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit court, but only because the Fourth Circuit did not recognize the misappropriation
theory at that time.87 In the companion case, United States v. Bryan, the defendant was the
director of the West Virginia state lottery, where he manipulated the lottery corporation into
awarding two government contracts to particular companies doing business with the lottery
corporation. He then profitably traded the stock of those companies using the confidential
information.88 His conviction for insider trading on the misappropriation theory was also
reversed.
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit also rejected the misappropriation theory in United States v.
O’Hagan. Mr. O’Hagan was an attorney whose firm represented an acquiring company, Grand
Met that was tendering an offer to a target corporation, Pillsbury. O’Hagan purchased stock
options and the stock of Pillsbury and then sold them for a $4 million profit when the offer was
86
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publicly announced.89 The attorney was convicted in the district court, but the Eighth Circuit
reversed, because it did not recognize the misappropriation theory. The Supreme Court heard the
government’s appeal and reversed the Eighth Circuit thereby upholding the conviction and, more
importantly, recognizing the misappropriation theory.
The Court approved the misappropriation theory, and applied it to the O’Hagan case as
follows: the attorney owed Grand Met, the client of his law firm, a duty of confidentiality, so
when he purchased Pillsbury’s stock he committed fraud on the source of the information, his
law firm’s client Grand Met. In other words, he stole the information from his law firm’s client
and was guilty of insider trading even though he owed Pillsbury no fiduciary duty.90 It was
assumed by the Court that as an attorney O’Hagan owed his client a duty of confidentiality
including the duty to refrain from using any confidential information gained from interaction
with the client for personal profit without obtaining the client’s consent.91 In O’Hagan, the
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he misappropriation theory is thus designed to ‘protec[t] the
integrity of the securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation who have access
to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation’s security price when revealed, but
who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders.’”92
The case left three unanswered questions.93 The first is what if the attorney or
misappropriator informed the source of the information to which the attorney owed a duty that he
or she was going to trade using the information? Second, what if the source of the information
authorized the use of the information to trade? Presumably, the answer to these two questions is
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that the quasi-insider is not liable. Third, what theory did the Supreme Court use to prohibit the
misappropriation of insider information? The Court did not clarify whether it was a fiduciary
duty theory as put forth in Chiarella, a theory of abstain or disclose as in Texas Gulf & Sulphur,
or a theory of property rights as Judge Winter advocated in Chestman. Rather, the Court stated
that it was meant to protect the market against abuses by non-traditional insiders. I will defer
application of this reasoning to the short-selling plaintiff to a later section.

4. Two More Developments: Rule 10b5-1 & Regulation FD
One unanswered question from O’Hagan is when is an insider who possesses material
non-public information prohibited from trading? Is it whenever the insider possesses the
information or when the insider actually uses the information as the reason for the trade? The
SEC has always maintained that it is whenever the insider had the information, regardless of
whether the information was the basis of the trade. This is known as the “possession” view of
insider trading and stems from the SEC’s original view that anyone, fiduciary or not, who
possessed material non-public information should refrain from trading. The Second Circuit
initially adopted this view.94 Later, however, other courts rejected it. The Eleventh Circuit in
SEC v. Adler and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Smith adopted the “use test” for both civil
and criminal liability, which imposes liability only when the insider actually uses the information
as the basis of the trade. In response to this, the SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1 to supplement Rule
10b-5. Rule 10b-5(1)(a)-(b) states that
(a) General. The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act
(15 U.S.C. 78j) and § 240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale
of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security
or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other
person who is the source of the material nonpublic information.
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(b) Definition of “on the basis of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this
section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware
95
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale.

Part (b) of Rule 10b-5(1) re-iterates that the SEC prohibits any insider who possesses material
non-public information from trading the stock of the company, even if the trade was not
motivated by the information. No court has adjudicated whether the language of Section 10(b) in
fact authorizes this rule.
The SEC, when passing Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000, also passed Regulation Fair
Disclosure96, which requires issuers of securities to disclose any information they wish to
disclose to either all or no one.97 The regulation was passed by the SEC in response to a
perceived lack of a level playing field in the securities market. Corporations were perceived to
be disclosing sensitive information to a select group of analysts while the average investor was
left out. Thus Regulation FD requires that if any material information is disclosed at all, it must
be disclosed to all.

5. Why is Insider Trading Illegal?
Before deciding whether plaintiffs should or can be deemed insiders, it is instructive to
list some of the arguments that scholars have advanced in favor of or against the prohibition of
insider trading. Looking at these reasons will be useful in deciding where to fit the plaintiff.
Henry Manne first proposed that insider trading should be legal on two grounds. The
first is that allowing insiders to trade will push the price of the stock in the correct direction.
This will be beneficial to existing shareholders, since they will see more information in the price
95
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of their shares. For example, if the price of a company’s stock is currently $10, and the insider
learns that of some good news that will raise the price of the share to $20 when the news is
revealed, then if the insider starts to purchase shares based on the non-public information, the
purchase will start to push the price of the shares upwards. The price will rise from $10 to $11,
for example, and this will signal to the market that some good news is on the way. Had the
insider not been allowed to purchase any shares, the market would think that the correct share
price is $10, and some shareholders might be inclined to sell the stock. If the insider is allowed
to purchase the shares, then an existing shareholder may decide not to sell the shares if the price
starts rising. The argument is the same if the news is bad, and the insider decides to short-sell or
dumps his or her holdings.
The corporation may not be able to adequately compensate the insider, who is typically
an officer, because of difficulties in negotiating a compensation formula that encourages the
officer to undertake an optimal amount of effort to maximize the value of the firm. By allowing
the insider to take advantage of non-public information, information the insider may have had a
role in creating, the insider can be compensated. The evidence for these propositions is mixed at
best with many studies showing that when insiders trade no such price corrections take place.98
On the other hand, however, scholars have argued that insider trading harms investors by
undermining their confidence in the integrity of the market. Proponents of this theory argue that
non-insider investors will become wary of purchasing any stock in a corporation if they think
that an insider is selling the shares. This leads to a reduction in what the insider can sell the
shares for, and hence the insider receives less compensation from the market for his or her effort.
This leads to a further lack of effort, which means that the insider will focus more on maximizing
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profits from insider trading than on generating wealth for the corporation. In addition to the
harm caused by insiders not exerting the proper level of effort, this could ultimately lead to a
non-functioning securities market. Empirical evidence shows that there is some truth to this
argument.99
Judge Ralph Winter of the Second Circuit and Professor Bainbridge developed another
theory of why insider trading is prohibited. It is known as the property rights theory and argues
that the information upon which the insider bases his or her trades is actually the property of the
corporation. The information belongs to the corporation; therefore the insider is stealing the
information when a trade is made.100 Allowing the insider to use information, which is a scarce
and costly commodity, will diminish the incentives to produce information for the benefit of the
corporation thereby depriving the shareholders of profit maximizing opportunities. The rationale
in O’Hagan, however, did nothing to clarify whether this indeed was the theory under which
non-classical insiders were prohibited from trading. In his analysis of whether an attorney was
allowed to trade using information gleaned from the client, Professor Bainbridge (writing before
the O’Hagan decision) argued that the client possesses a property right in the information
regarding the suit. Bainbridge constructed a hypothetical bargain where he surmised that the
client would most likely want any information concerning the suit to be the client’s property, and
furthermore, any attorney would agree to such a bargain ex ante.
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Armed with these three theories of why insider trading should be illegal: the harm to the
corporation itself, the property rights theory, and the fraud in sale theory, it is possible to
evaluate the status of the short-selling plaintiff and his attorney.

IV. Analysis of The Short-Selling Plaintiffs’ Attorney
The decision in O’Hagan and the language in Dirks (or ReBrook if the Fourth Circuit had
adopted the misappropriation theory) makes it clear that attorneys cannot use confidential
information gleaned from a client to profit.101 This suggests that the attorneys who sold JC
Penney’s stock short and the short-sellers who received the information from the attorneys could
be liable for insider trading under the misappropriation theory.
An attorney owes the client a duty of confidentiality. Furthermore, the decision of
whether to sue in the first place is the quintessential decision that only the client can make. If the
client was thinking of suing a defendant, but had not publicly stated so, it would be unethical for
the attorney to disclose this fact to anyone.102 The duty of confidentiality would require that the
attorney not disclose any such information, unless the client consents. A psychiatrist, who used
the information learnt from his patient, was guilty of insider trading on the misappropriation
theory for violating the oath of confidentiality to the patient.103 Thus an attorney who uses the
information obtained from the client to profitably short-sell the stock of a defendant corporation
the client intends on suing should likewise be guilty of insider trading. Furthermore, if the
attorney discloses the information to another short-seller, the short-seller is equally guilty of
insider trading for misappropriating confidential information.
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The more interesting question is what if the client consents to the attorney using the
information?; or for that matter, what if the client is the one short-selling? The present case is
unique in that the plaintiff is an outsider who did not receive the information from the
corporation, but rather, is the source of the information itself. The answer to this is not clear, at
least from an insider trading point of view. The Supreme Court in O’Hagan seemed to suggest
that if the client has consented, all would be legitimate.104 Perhaps this is true. But that does not
settle the status of the plaintiff who does the short-selling. For if it is legal for the plaintiff to
short-sell, then giving permission to the attorney is also legal. If, conversely, it were illegal for
the plaintiff to sell short, then giving permission to the attorney would not immunize the
transaction.
In the actual cases against those accused of insider trading under the theory of
misappropriation, one assumption that the courts have been working under is that the client
would have never consented to the misappropriator using the information. This is akin to
reconstructing the hypothetical bargain that Professor Bainbridge used to construct the property
rights theory of why an attorney should not trade using the client’s information. For example, in
the O’Hagan case, the defendant misappropriated information belonging to the client concerning
the client’s merger with the firm whose stock the defendant bought. If the client were merging
with another firm, the client firm would not want that information to become public since such
publicity would lead to large changes in the prices of both firms. Such change could affect the
success of the proposed merger. And even though, there might be an instance where a particular
acquirer may want or allow someone else to purchase more shares in the target company, a
priori, all potential acquirers would want to commit to a certain set of rules such as a the lack of
secret purchases or premature disclosure before any talks of a merger. In merger talks, it is
104
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important that secrecy be maintained, because if the news became public before the deal was
finalized, another bidder could come in and successfully outbid the initial company. Deciding
what price to offer and what terms to use in the deal requires enormous resources, and once the
news of the price and terms of the deal are leaked, a rival acquirer can free-ride on the research
of the first acquirer and use that information to make a rival bid without incurring the cost. So
while the acquirer may have the temptation to purchase more shares, after the deal is done or is
pending, and let its employees and agents such as lawyers purchase more shares (in order to
diminish the number of shares that it needs to bid on and to remove more shares from potential
rivals), ex ante, the acquirer would want to commit to secrecy and non-disclosure of such
information. Likewise, the target company would also demand secrecy since it would be looking
out for the best interests of its shareholders. It would also want the acquirer to refrain from
allowing secret purchases by the acquirer’s insiders and misappropriators, so it would probably
insist on such terms before entering into any deal. Hence, a hypothetical bargaining scenario can
be constructed whereby it makes sense to prevent attorneys such as Mr. O’Hagan from
purchasing the stock of his client’s target.
Similarly in the psychiatrist case, the patient would not have wanted that information to
become public. Patients speak freely to their psychiatrists expecting confidentiality, and
needless to say it would be akin to professional betrayal to find out that their psychiatrist had
purchased stock with that information. Again, even if a particular client would not mind that
their doctor profited using information revealed in their session (perhaps as a means of extra
compensation), a priori, we could argue that patients would demand that no such information be
used.
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In the short-selling attorney case, however, a plaintiff who is angry with a company and
is about to sue it may not care too much if the news is made public. If anything, the plaintiff
may want the price to fall as a pressure tactic to force the defendant to settle, just as in the Bayer
story discussed above. In such a case any theory that attempts to find liability with a shortselling plaintiff’s attorney must also be able to find liability with a short-selling plaintiff.
Otherwise, the plaintiff can always consent to the attorney short-selling, since the plaintiff has
little incentive to keep the information secret. In the misappropriation examples from the case
law, the insider from whom the misappropriator learnt the information did owe some duty of
confidentiality stemming from a statutory or legal requirement. In this case, little statutory or
legal requirements govern the behavior of plaintiffs. The plaintiff is free to shout in the street “I
plan on suing the company”, tell his friends, file the suit earlier than planned, or withdraw the
suit completely. The bottom line is that unless the attorney short-sells without the permission of
the client, little from the classical law of insider trading prohibits the conduct in question,
because the plaintiff is free to short-sell and is not necessarily adverse to the attorney doing the
same.

V. Analysis of The Short-Selling Plaintiff
My survey of the law has identified two potential rubrics under which the short-selling
plaintiff’s conduct may fall. These are Regulation FD and fraud and market manipulation
including insider trading. In that order I will discuss whether the conduct of the plaintiff can be
proscribed.
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1. Regulation FD for Plaintiffs and their Lawyers: Will it Help?
Recall that the Washington Legal Foundation has recommended that the SEC enact an
equivalent of Regulation FD for plaintiffs’ attorneys to require them to disclose any
conversations they may have with market analysts. Alternatively, Regulation FD could be
expanded to include plaintiffs’ attorneys in addition to corporate insiders. The question is
whether this proposal can curb the conduct of the short-selling plaintiffs and their attorneys?
The quick answer is no. There are several reasons. First, Regulation FD itself applies
only to the issuers of securities and not to the analysts, since it was passed according to the
powers granted to it by sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the SEA, among others.105 Hence, how
Regulation FD could apply to trial lawyers communicating with analysts is not clear. The SEC
does have the power to regulate investment companies through the Investment Companies Act,
so perhaps it is feasible for the SEC to regulate such communications. The trial attorneys and the
plaintiffs, however, do not come under the reach of Regulation FD or the statutory provisions.
Any extension of Regulation FD, therefore, would have to come from the SEC’s general power
to regulate the securities market. Furthermore, if the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney simply
wished to sell the defendant’s stock short without any communications with the analysts,
Regulation FD or its equivalent for attorneys would have no impact. What is needed is a rule
that requires all plaintiffs and their attorneys to disclose their intention to sue before shortselling.
Another problem is that Regulation FD was never meant to be part of the anti-fraud
arsenal provided by section 10(b) of the SEA and the corresponding Rule 10b-5,106 but fraud, or
at least the appearance of fraud, is precisely what is going on here. The idea behind Regulation
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FD was to provide the whole market with any information disclosed, in order to give everyone
the opportunity to digest the information. What the plaintiffs and their attorneys are doing when
they short-sell the defendant’s stock is to prosper at the expense of shareholders because of an
event that they caused exclusively. If there were no lawsuit, there would be no drop in price.
Whether this is truly fraud or not, I will leave for a later section, but suffice it to say that
Regulation FD was not designed to combat fraud. Again, if the plaintiff sold the defendant’s
stock short there would be no issue of selective disclosure, and Regulation FD would not apply.
Furthermore, it seems that currently a violation of regulation of FD gives no private cause of
action.107 And while some recent SEC enforcement of Regulation FD has resulted in severe
penalties, private enforcement of anti-fraud statutes and rules provides extra incentive to monitor
the wrongdoers.108 In fact, one commentator has stated that the “SEC should target the real
problem: the trading rather than the disclosure.”109
Hence, what is needed is a rule that prevents market manipulation by the plaintiffs and
their attorneys. This means that those SEA provisions and their corresponding rules with respect
to fraud are the ones that must be used to combat the problem of the short-selling attorney.

2. Does Short-Selling by the Plaintiff Constitute Market Manipulation and Fraud?
Before discussing general market fraud and manipulation, I will address the status of
plaintiffs as insiders. Plaintiffs are not insiders, unless they happen to be officers or directors.
They, therefore, owe no fiduciary duties to shareholders or future shareholders. This makes the
case of insider trading against the short-selling plaintiff a hard one. But insider trading is only
one subsection of the prohibition against fraud in the securities market. The examples of “pump
107
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and dump” and “Cyber-smear” discussed above are also examples of prohibited fraudulent
conduct.
The cases of “pump and dump” and “Cyber-smear” all involved an individual who
profited after spreading false and misleading stories. A plaintiff who is about to sue a company,
will cause the price of the company’s stock to fall, and will consequently be able to profitably
short-sell the stock (or whoever sells the stock short based on a tip from the attorney). The
question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff is analogous in culpability to the cases above of the
short-sellers who spread false stories? On the one hand, at a basic level, the two seem quite
similar. The plaintiff causes the price of the stock to fall as do the spreaders of false information.
The act of suing a company will cause some fall in the price of the stock, and this fall can be as
large as those caused by the short-selling false news spreaders. On the other hand, there is one
major difference between the two. The short-sellers spreading the false information are
spreading information, while the plaintiff’s attorneys is engaging in an act. Furthermore, the
information is false, while the act is true and based on some underlying set of facts. Hence,
while there is a superficial analogy between the smearing short-seller and the short-selling
plaintiff’s attorney, the analogy breaks down. Had the attorney not sold the stock short, there
would be no question regarding the legality of filing the suit; whereas even if the individuals
spreading false information had not sold the stock short, the spreading of the false news would
still be a criminal act.
Unless there is absolutely no basis for the underlying suit, in which case the attorney risks
sanctions by the court, any lawsuit is presumed to have some merit as long as the attorney had
some good faith belief in the validity of the suit.110 This means that the underlying act of suing
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the company would not be fraudulent. Then again, plaintiffs’ attorneys have filed numerous
frivolous suits and have escaped any judicial sanctions (such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).111 Do these frivolous non-sanctionable suits indicate that the short-selling
plaintiff and the attorney are acting fraudulently? And what of suits that have no merit under
current jurisprudence, but the plaintiffs and their attorneys genuinely believe they have a chance
of winning? Suppose they sue and short-sell the stock at the same time. Immediate profit from
short-selling is certain, and there may be a high probability that the suit will be dismissed. Have
they manipulated the market? This is not an easy question to answer. The attorneys acting in
good faith did not intend to defraud the market since they genuinely believed the merits of their
case. This suggests that perhaps such conduct is not fraudulent.
Furthermore, the variation among states in their standards for when frivolous suits can be
sanctioned means that a plaintiff who desires to only lower the price of the stock has to file the
lawsuit in the state court of the jurisdiction least hostile to frivolous suits. The manipulative
plaintiff does not have to worry about removal to federal court, because the only motive behind
the plaintiff’s suit is to lower the price of the stock. Once the suit is announced, the plaintiff can
profitably settle the short position and withdraw the suit.
A more problematic case arises when an attorney files a lawsuit with a good faith belief
in the merits and with the intention of causing the price of the stock to fall enabling a profitable
short-sale.112 This is a harder case to analyze. Is it fraud to trade the stocks of a corporation with
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the intent that the price of the stock will fall (or rise for that matter) fraud? If there was a
fraudulent act, the answer would be yes. But here there is no fraudulent act. The plaintiff is
actually filing a lawsuit, and in my hypothetical the suit has merit.
What if the plaintiff and the attorney do not have a good faith belief in the merits of the
case, but are simply suing in order to lower the price of the shares to allow for the profitable
short-sale? This is arguably akin to the Terayon scenario. In this case, perhaps the short-selling
plaintiff has committed securities fraud. But the reader should note that only where it is clear
that there is absolutely no merit legally or factually to the plaintiff’s case can there be a definite
statement that the short-selling plaintiff has committed fraud. This inquiry, however, would
require the court to look at the underlying suit to judge whether the suit was frivolous. Given the
lack of sanctions even when the suit seems frivolous, a court trying to decide if the short-selling
plaintiff committed fraud would have to either defer to the lack of sanctions or investigate the
merits of the original suit. This would be a costly affair. What is needed is a clearer way to
either allow or prohibit the plaintiff from selling short the stock of their targets. This, I argue is
why plaintiffs should be deemed insiders, even though they do not fit into either the classical
insider or the misappropriation model.

VI

Other Legal and Economic Considerations for Analysis of Securities Fraud
Having established that a plaintiff is neither an insider nor is committing fraud (in the

traditional securities law sense of the word), the other question is whether the short-selling
plaintiff is committing fraud under other areas of the law, such as tort law or contract law. It is
important to remember that the purpose of securities law is to ensure honest markets where fraud
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and other deceptive devices are minimized. If what constitutes fraud under the law of torts or
contract is being committed, then surely securities law ought to combat it. The short- selling
plaintiff when selling the security to another purchaser is not an insider (nor has misappropriated
the information from an insider), and hence owes no fiduciary duty to the purchaser. The shortselling plaintiff, however, is engaged in a contract for sale, and is therefore subject to the laws of
contract and torts.
The law in many states held that insiders did not necessarily have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders (or for that matter non-shareholders to whom the insider sold their shares short),
and some courts held that unless there was some face-to-face transaction then perhaps a fiduciary
duty might arise (a fact that is absent in today’s electronic trading environment).113 Nonetheless,
federal insider trading law has proceeded on the assumption that all insiders do owe current and
future shareholders fiduciary duties even when the trading is done in an impersonal market.114
Whether this is to combat fraud or to protect the firm’s property rights in the information is
unclear. Nevertheless, federal law has marched down this path.
If the purpose of federal securities law is to prevent fraud, then the law of torts
concerning fraud must be examined to see if non-disclosure by a seller can be considered fraud.
Generally speaking, non-disclosure was not considered fraudulent or actionable, as the common
law was resistant to mandate all disclosures in sales’ contracts, and it is no accident that statutory
law has filled that void.115 Nonetheless, there is some support in earlier common law for the
requirement to disclose latent defects although nineteenth century common law seemed to favor
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the caveat emptor approach.116 Modern tort law, however, has recognized that in some instances
non-disclosure can be fraudulent. Section 551(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain
from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.

The Restatement does not define when the seller is under a duty to disclose, but some
illustrations from the case law can help in understanding when the duty to disclose arises.
Consider the case of Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., Inc.,117 where the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that a plaintiff purchaser of a residential lot, who alleged that the vendor had not
disclosed the existence of a hidden well under the land surface, stated a cause of action for
intentional misrepresentation even though the vendor simply did not disclose the existence of the
well. The Court recognized that the law used to be that for arm’s length transactions, there was
no duty to disclose. Societal norms, however, the Court observed, dictate that fairness and good
faith dealings be weaved into the law. The Court cited approvingly Dean Prosser’s observation
of a
rather amorphous tendency on the part of most courts toward finding a duty of disclosure in cases where
the defendant has special knowledge or means of knowledge not open to the plaintiff and is aware that the
plaintiff is acting under a misapprehension as to facts which could be of importance to him, and would
probably affect his decision.118

The facts of Ollerman and the reasoning cited are quite applicable to the short-selling plaintiff.
An imminent lawsuit that will bring certain harm to the stock being sold short seems a far more
relevant fact that should be disclosed than the existence of a well below the land surface.
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Reasonable minds may disagree over whether a purchaser would deem the existence of well to
be sufficiently important to affect the decision to purchase and the price to pay, but no one would
disagree over whether a purchaser of stock would deem information about an impending lawsuit
that will lower the stock price to be important.
Consider also the case of Caldwell v. Pop's Homes, Inc.119 A purchaser of a mobile home
sued the seller who neglected to disclose the fact that the park where the mobile home was
located was going to be sold and all mobile homes located there would have to move. The Court
of Appeals of Oregon reversed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the purchaser. The Court held that silence in this case was fraudulent, because
the purchaser had indicated that he wanted to live in the park and the seller knew that the park
was being sold. It is interesting to note that the silence was with respect to a future action by a
third party, namely the park owner. The Court held that silence with respect to a third party’s
future action can constitute fraud especially if the silence is motivated by a desire to effectuate a
sale that may not have taken place if the information was disclosed. It seems that the Court
looked at whether the sale would have taken place had the critical information been disclosed, as
opposed to whether disclosure of the information might have affected the price. Since the
purchaser wanted to live in the park, he would not have bought the mobile home had he known
he would have to move.
The Court also cited several other cases where silence regarding the actions of a third
party constituted fraud.120 In one case,121 the court held that when the defendant sold real
property, a portion of which was included in condemnation proceedings, and did not disclose this
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information to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had a cause of action. In another case,122 the defendant
sold a hotel without disclosing that the hotel was about to lose its permit in a few days, and in
another case,123 the defendant sold a beer tavern without disclosing that the supply of beer by the
brewery supplying the tavern was about to be curtailed. In the latter two cases, the courts held
that a cause of action for fraud could be maintained. In all of these cases, silence with respect to
a future act by a third party was held to be fraudulent. It seems, therefore, that if the seller were
silent about his or her own future action, it would be a fraudulent transaction.124
What determines whether silence regarding the seller’s future act is fraudulent seems to
be whether the purchaser would have actually proceeded with the transaction, or perhaps
demanded a much lower price. A purchaser who buys a mobile home with the intention of
staying in the park where the home is located would clearly regard the information that the park
was about to be sold as crucial to his decision to purchase the home. Similarly, a purchaser who
buys a piece of property that is about to be condemned, a hotel that will lose its permit or a beer
tavern that will lose some of its beer would consider such information as critical, fundamental,
and material to the decision to purchase in the first place.
The economics literature also can provide some insight into when disclosure should be
mandated. Professor Hirshleifer provided such insight over thirty years ago,125 when he
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differentiated between “foreknowledge” and “discovery”. Discovery is information that requires
investment in time, effort, and other mechanisms to reveal the information that is hidden, while
foreknowledge is information that will be revealed eventually with little effort on anyone’s part.
The information that comes from discovery is also wealth creating, while the information from
foreknowledge is simply wealth re-distributing. Discovery is socially beneficial, so the law
should be structured to encourage discovery by creating the right incentives for those who can
engage in discovery to do so. In contrast, since foreknowledge is simply information enabling
the possessor to re-distribute wealth away from the non-possessors, there are no compelling
reasons to encourage acquiring foreknowledge.126
Professor Shavell uses this insight to conclude that a seller who possesses foreknowledge
should be required to disclose such information to reduce the incentive for wastefully acquiring
information that is not wealth creating.127 Professor Eisenberg also reaches a similar result
whereby he proclaims that “[a]n actor should be required to make disclosure to correct a
counterparty's mistaken tacit assumption unless: the actor is a buyer, the information is more
than mere foreknowledge, ….”128
Having established that non-disclosure can rise to the level of fraud, the next section will
now establish that the short-selling plaintiff is committing fraud as defined by federal securities
law.
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VII. Is the Short-Selling Plaintiff Committing Fraud?
It remains necessary, in the present case, to establish that the plaintiff owed a duty of
confidentiality to the shareholders of the defendant corporation since the plaintiff is not an
insider in any traditional sense of the word. Cases dealing with “misappropriation” usually
involve a lawyer, investment banker or another agent of an insider who is involved with the
corporation. But could a plaintiff be considered a quasi-insider? Recall that quasi-insiders are
those who possess non-public information obtained from a source outside the corporation that
may affect the price of the stock. The plaintiff has not obtained any information from anywhere;
rather, the plaintiff is the source of the information. The plaintiff is the cause of the information
and as such owes the shareholders no fiduciary duty (unless perhaps the plaintiff was a
shareholder). For this reason, unless the attorney was the one selling the stock short without the
consent or knowledge of the client, it is hard to make a case against the attorney.
Therefore, there needs, to be a special category for the short-selling plaintiff and the
attorney. They need to be deemed constructive or temporary insiders at least until news of the
lawsuit is made public. Otherwise a perverse situation exists. No one can make a misleading
statement regarding a company whose stock they sell short, but instead they can short-sell the
stock of a company and then sue the company causing the price of its stock to fall. Fraudulent
columnists and analysts as well as the cyber-smearers would simply need a lawyer and a broker
to carry out what is otherwise forbidden.
With this potential mischief in mind, one should also bear in mind that the Supreme
Court has been very flexible in interpreting section 10(b) in order to “effectuate its remedial
purposes.”129 This is because “[a]mong Congress’ objectives in passing the Act was to ensure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence” after the market crash of
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1929. More generally, Congress sought “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.”130 This analysis is similar to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s analysis in
Ollerman,131 where is decided to replace the traditional common law rule of no duty to disclose
with a rule requiring disclosure when the information concealed was material to the transaction.
Similarly, in the case of Zweig v. Hearst Corp.132 the court looked at the need for honest
markets when holding a journalist liable for insider trading.133 Shareholders who purchase
shares from the short-selling plaintiff do so with the belief that the market is honest and free of
manipulation. While it is true that anyone buying a share does so with a certain assumption of
risk to follow, no shareholder would purchase a share from someone who is about to be the cause
of the demise of their shares’ value immediately after the trade is consummated. It would be
akin to a terrorist or a saboteur who intends on destroying the company’s assets short-selling the
company’s shares just before carrying out his actions. No purchaser would ever consent to such
a trade. While the plaintiff would not traditionally owe any fiduciary duty to those whom he sold
the shares to, nonetheless, just as the courts have imposed a duty on insiders (who did not
traditionally owe any duties to purchasers) to abstain from short-selling based on insider
information, so should the courts prohibit plaintiffs from similar transactions. Those courts that
have found for plaintiffs under the theory of fraudulent non-disclosure would probably find
against the short-selling plaintiff. And just as the federal courts did not pay attention to the
variations among states with respect to their laws of whether insider owed shareholders fiduciary
duties precluding them from insider trading, so should the federal courts pay attention to the
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underlying aim of preventing fraud regardless of any variation among states with respect to the
law of fraudulent non-disclosure.
The short-selling plaintiffs are in a similar position to Mr. O’Hagan when the Supreme
Court held that “[t]he misappropriation theory is thus designed to ‘protec[t] the integrity of the
securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation who have access to confidential
information that will affect th[e] corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no
fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders.’”134 Here the plaintiff is the outsider
who does not owe any fiduciary duty to the shareholders, but who has confidential information,
namely the intent to sue, that will adversely affect the stock price when revealed.
Using Professor Bainbridge’s property hypothetical bargain metaphor can also be helpful
in the analysis. The question is would someone purchase shares from an insider who had some
certain and relevant information about the diminution in the value of the shares, especially if the
source of the diminution is an imminent act by the seller? The answer is no. The reader should
note that there is a difference between someone purchasing an item that may or may not
depreciate in value due to uncertainty on both sides of the transaction. This is typical in the sale
of goods and shares in the marketplace. There is a difference, however, between someone who
purchases a diamond from a dealer at current market price where both sides do not have a certain
view of where the price will be tomorrow and someone who purchases a diamond from a dealer
where the dealer knows that the item is not a real diamond but rather a fake. In the former, the
contract of sale has allocated the risk of price fluctuation on the parties (the purchaser buys the
upside potential while seller buys the security against the downside risk), while in the latter there
is fraudulent misrepresentation. A purchaser who purchased an item under fraudulent
circumstances would be entitled to elect from a host of remedies including rescission, the benefit
134
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of the bargain damages, and restitution. Restitution, which is the disgorgement of the gain to the
wrongdoer, is the normal remedy in many fraudulent misrepresentation cases.
In the case of the terrorist short-selling stock, the purchaser would never have consented
to such a purchase had he known that the seller was about to devalue the stock. Similarly, the
purchaser of shares from a plaintiff who will soon sue the company would never have entered
into such a transaction.
It seems intuitive, that a purchaser buying shares from a plaintiff who short-sells the
stock of a company that he or she is about to sue, would consider information regarding the
potential lawsuit as critical. While everyone who buys a stock takes on the risk of a drop in its
price, no one would purchase shares in a company that is about to be sued by the seller. Such a
drop in price is almost certain, and as some of the studies I cited at the beginning of the paper
show, the drop can be substantial. In fact, the short-selling plaintiff would only short- sell if he or
she thought that there would be a substantial drop in the price. Hence, it is almost tautological
that a purchaser would never buy stock from a short-selling plaintiff.
In addition to justifying restitution against the short-selling plaintiff on the grounds of
fraud, the target corporation should be able to assert restitution (especially if the purchasers of
the stock do not) on the grounds that the plaintiff suing the company owes the shareholders
generally a duty of no double recovery. This is not a duty in the typical sense of the word, but
rather it is a principle from the law of remedies. The courts have always been careful to fashion
remedies both legal and equitable that avoid double recovery. A plaintiff who sues a company
and short- sells the stock at the same time will be enriching himself twice.
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose the plaintiff has a 100% certain
claim of $1,000,000 against a company, and suppose the market correctly assesses the
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probability and magnitude of the suit. At the moment of the suit’s announcement, the market
value of the firm should fall at least by $1,000,000. If the plaintiff were able to short-sell every
share, or more likely a fraction of the shares, then the plaintiff would have profited by
$1,000,000 or the fraction thereof. The plaintiff will recover the full $1,000,000 from the
lawsuit, and now will also recover the extra amount reflecting the market’s assessment that the
firm will be losing the million dollars. The plaintiff has recovered twice from the same event.
Generally speaking, where such double recovery takes place, the defendant is usually
entitled to restitution. Restitution is a remedy for an unjust enrichment, which is exactly what
the plaintiff has experienced: an unjust enrichment at the expense of the shareholders to whom
he sold the shares. The shareholder will not only have to bear the pro-rata cost of paying the
plaintiff his claim, the plaintiff is recovering twice after misrepresenting the sale to the
purchaser.
There are three factors combined that make the case for deeming a plaintiff a constructive
insider. The first is the fact that the plaintiff can manipulate the price of the shares by timing the
announcement of the lawsuit. The second is that the shareholder who purchased the shares
would never have done so if aware if an impending suit, and could make the case for rescission
on the grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation. Third, the plaintiff who sues will be recovering
twice if allowed to profitably short-sell the defendant’s stock. These three factors suggest that
the public policy reasons are very strong in this situation, and demand that plaintiffs and their
attorneys refrain from trading until they announce their suit or the intention of launching it.
Furthermore, just as the empirical evidence on insider trading revealed more volatility
and perhaps less liquidity in markets where insider trading is permitted, allowing plaintiffs to
short-sell their targets would also create mistrust and inefficiency in the market. Purchasers
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would be leery of shares in companies who could be potential targets of lawsuits, not just
because the company might be sued, but because the seller could be the very person who will sue
immediately after the sale takes place.
The law and economics research of Shavell and Eisenberg also lends support to the
argument for deeming the short-selling plaintiff an insider. The act of suing is mere
foreknowledge, not discoverable information. In fact, allowing the plaintiff to short-sell allows
double recovery and thereby creates an overincentive for the plaintiff to sue. The arguments in
favor of insider trading, namely providing insiders with the incentive to discover valuable
information for the firm, do not hold here. The result, if the plaintiff were allowed to short-sell,
would be for more lawsuits and short-selling.135
For all of these reasons, the plaintiff should be deemed a temporary insider until the
decision to sue is made public either by the filing itself or by an announcement of the intention to
sue. The next question, therefore, is what path can the law take to achieving this desired result?
If the courts deem the plaintiffs as constructive or deemed insiders, the courts could take
the approach they have taken with respect Rule 10b5-1. If the courts adopt the “possession”
theory of insider trading, i.e. that trading while in possession of non-public material information
is enough for insider trading liability, then a potential plaintiff who sells a defendant
corporation’s stock short and then sues may be liable under this theory of liability. All plaintiffs
would be required to abstain from short-selling the defendant corporation, which would mean
that short-sellers who decided to sue after executing a short sale would be prohibited from suing
no matter how legitimate the suit. On the other hand, if the “use” theory prevails, then by
analogy only plaintiffs who short-sell and then sue in order to profit will be liable. Incidental
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plaintiffs, i.e. those who were short in the market and then decided to sue for other reasons,
would be exempt from liability. Examples of these incidental plaintiffs include short-sellers who
suddenly develop a legitimate dispute with the corporation such as a breach of contract or a tort
claim. For example, a short-seller may be using a drug manufactured by a company in which he
maintains a short position in without even knowing that the company is the manufacturer. If the
drug were to harm the short-seller, then under this scenario, the short-seller would be permitted
to sue. The suit is motivated by actual recovery rather than a profit from the short sales. Under
the “possession” theory, if applied to plaintiffs, the short-seller in the hypothetical would be
prohibited from suing, unless he cancelled his short position.136
Not to prohibit plaintiffs and their attorneys from trading their target’s stock would yield
perverse results. Instead of the Cardinal group spreading the bad news about Terayon to force its
price to drop, all they would have to do is simply sue for any plausible cause of action. Instead
of Jonathan Lebed or Jakob spreading false rumors in their “pump and dump” or “dump and
smear” schemes, all they would have to do is sue the firms after short-selling their stock. They
could have sued the company after executing a short sale, then re-purchased the stock cheaply
followed by announcing the withdrawal of the suit prompting a profitable rise in price of the
stock.
The result must be, therefore, that all plaintiffs are deemed insiders before they sue or
announce their lawsuit to the public. If the courts do not wish to extend the laws covering fraud
and insider trading to plaintiffs, then either the SEC through its regulatory promulgations or
Congress through legislation should act.

136

Implicit in this paper is that suits that have a de minimus impact on the value of the firm would be permitted by
short- sellers. Examples of such suits could include small-claims lawsuits.

51

VIII. What the Law should be and Concluding Thoughts
If the courts decline to adopt the view that plaintiffs are insiders until they announce their
intention to sue or actually commence the suit, then the door is open for the SEC or Congress to
act. Whatever arguments might exist in favor of insider trading generally, they do not apply
here; all of the arguments against insider trading, however, are applicable. Therefore, plaintiffs
and their attorneys should not be allowed to trade in the stocks of their targets and by extension
anyone who receives such information from either of the parties should also be prohibited from
trading.
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